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ABSTRACT
Of particular interest to researchers and practitioners is the impact of board members’
composition and characteristics on corporate activities. With the exception of studies focusing
on the gender of board members and the inside director-outside director dichotomy, much of the
research tends to treat directors as a homogeneous group. This study seeks to determine whether
a relationship exists between hospital directors’ length of tenure and their degree of involvement
in the strategic management process.
The results of a survey of 240 directors from twenty-one hospitals are analyzed. A
MANOVA, followed by a series of ANOVAs revealed significant differences between the longand short-tenure directors. In most areas those with relatively short board tenure tend to be less
engaged than their longer-tenured counterparts. The latter are more involved in developing
strategic alternatives, providing advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee
meetings, and setting standards for and evaluating the performance of the hospital and
management. However, both groups have very limited involvement in setting standards for
rewarding top management and evaluating their performance. Short-tenure directors are more
concerned with the interests of major stakeholders and promoting their goodwill and support.
Also, they are more actively involved in financial matters.
The results raise potentially important strategic dilemmas for hospitals and offer
proponents of changes in board composition support for their normative suggestions. Longertenured members are not as concerned with financial matters as well as stakeholders’ interests
and support as their short-tenured counterparts. Also, although longer-tenured members were
more active in setting standards for rewarding top management and assessing their performance,
it is important to note the limited involvement of both groups. The results show a reluctance by
both groups to set performance standards for top management and to formally evaluate their
performance.
INTRODUCTION
Directors are ultimately responsible for supervising management's performance and
ensuring that decisions are designed to maximize the value of the enterprise. They are expected
to help shape corporate management by providing impartial, sound, and experienced advice. A
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talented group of active directors is a strategic asset that businesses cannot afford to be without.
There is general agreement among organizational researchers, governance experts, and
business executives that, traditionally, boards have engaged in the strategic process only to the
extent that they legitimized proposals from corporate executives (Iacocca, 1984). However, in
recent years, the extent to which board members are involved in the corporate strategic decision
making process has become of major concern. This has sparked many research investigations.
Of particular interest is the board's decision making processes (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), the
structure of its committee membership (Kesner, 1988), its role in strategic management (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992), and its impact on financial performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), CEO
succession (Ocasio, 1999), and social responsibility (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995).
CONCENPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Board Involvement
To date, the board’s multiple roles and duties have been the most-studied aspect among
all board investigations. These studies identified several major responsibilities that capture
directors' most significant functions. A list of some of these is presented in Table 1.
______________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 1
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Author(s)

Year

Responsibilities

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Pfeffer and Salancik 1978

Advice and counsel
Oversight and control.

Ong and Lee

Monitoring the actions of executives on behalf of shareholders

2000

Hillman and Dalziel 2003

Providing input, resources, and advice in formulating strategies

Johnson et al.

1996

Establishing links with stakeholders
Participating in strategic planning

Boulton

1978

Reviewing overall board role and responsibilities
Reviewing operating variances and problem areas
Reviewing objectives and setting standards of performance
Reviewing business structure
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Evaluating strategic and operating plans
Reviewing standards for compensation and rewarding performance
Ensuring the organization's human resource development
Reviewing external trends
Setting policies for corporate action
______________________________________________________________________________
There is ample empirical evidence from organizations of many different kinds that
there are levels of board involvement, which can be represented as continua. One particularly
useful framework was developed three decades ago by Boulton (1978). He presented a model of
the "evolving board" for evaluating the role of directors in corporate strategic management. He
described the "changing of the board's role as ... a process of evolution in which the board moves
beyond providing basic legitimacy for the corporation to ... playing an involved role" (pp. 828829). The model's significance is twofold. First, it views the board's level of involvement as a
dynamic process in which a board may move from minimal participation to a critical contributor
______________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2
SCALES MEASURING BOARD INVOLVEMENT
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Author(s)

Year

Purpose of Scale

Judge and
Zeithmal

To measure board involvement in the formulation and evaluation
phases of the strategic decision-making process

1992

Westphal
Blake

1999
1999

To measure the degree to which directors:
monitor top management’s strategic decision making
formally evaluate the performance of top executives
defer to the judgment of top managers on final strategic decisions
develop performance objectives
require information showing progress against corporate objectives
analyze financial information for important issues and trends
analyze budget allocation against performance
review company performance against the strategic plan.

Westphal,
Dulewicz et al.

1999
1995

To measure the extent to which :
top executives solicit board assistance in strategy formulation
outside directors serve as a sounding board on strategic issues
directors provide advice and counsel outside of board and
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committee meetings
the board takes into account stakeholders’ legitimate interests
the board ensures that communications with stakeholders are
effective
the board promotes the goodwill and support of relevant
stakeholders
Zahra
Blake

1990
1999

To measure the degree to which the board:
articulates a company mission
analyzes the internal and external environments
identifies a strategic plan
develops strategic options and selects a final strategy
is involved in the strategic planning process
communicates the company's strategic direction throughout the
company
receives plans for the implementation of strategy from the CEO
benchmarks the strategic plan with industry comparative data.
______________________________________________________________________________
in the strategic process. Second, the model provides a theoretical framework for determining the
extent of board involvement in strategy making by identifying a number of categories of director
involvement. Another valuable contribution for evaluating the role of the board of directors in
corporate strategic management was developed by Wheelen and Hunger (2008). A board can be
characterized as being at a specific point on a continuum depending upon its degree of
involvement in strategic affairs. Accordingly, "boards can range from phantom boards with no
real involvement to catalyst boards with a very high degree of involvement" (p. 28).
Writers have offered a variety of scales for determining the extent of board participation
in strategic decisions. Table 2 shows these scales and the areas they purport to measure. In
addition, a number of writers have examined the degree of board involvement in these decisions.
Unfortunately, when viewed as a whole, the results are mixed and inconclusive, thus limiting the
number of definitive conclusions that can be drawn. Some have found that executives are
resisting increased board involvement in the strategic process. Other evidence suggests that
board members are reacting to various external pressures with active participation. Table 3
shows a list of the key studies.
Board Characteristics and Composition
The boards of many types of organizations have been examined from a wide variety of
perspectives. Almost three decades ago a number of writers expressed the need to study the
profiles of corporate upper echelons in order to understand an organization’s strategic processes.
They asserted that strategic decisions reflect the background of the organization’s most powerful
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executives and decision makers, and what the organization does could be explained, at least in
part, by their profile. In their seminal work on Upper Echelon theory, Hambrick and Mason
(1984) articulated an ambitious research agenda by proposing a number of hypotheses for testing
the relationship between strategic choice and certain demographic characteristics of key decision
makers. Demographic composition offers the advantage of being objective and testable. By
virtue of their position, organizational leaders are more capable of perceiving and understanding
relevant environmental trends and communicating them to the rest of the organization.
Consistent with this view, one important line of research has been devoted to an
examination of one segment of the firm's upper echelon - its board of directors. Of particular
interest is the impact of the board’s composition and characteristics on corporate activities.
However, with the exception of studies focusing on the gender of board members and the inside
director-outside director dichotomy, much of the research tends to treat directors as a
homogeneous group.
Hospital Directors
One segment of the literature on directors has been devoted to the study of hospital
governing boards. Table 4 presents some of the key studies. These investigations have been
instrumental in focusing attention on the composition and characteristics of hospital boards.
One area which has remained relatively unexplored is the relationship between board members’
organizational tenure and the extent of their involvement in corporate strategy. Tenure is
different from other attributes such as sex, race, or age because it is affected by personal choices;
one can elect to remain in an organization or leave it. It “is usually taken to mean time of
continuous service with a single organization” (Lovett & Cole, 2003, p. 4).
To date very little is known regarding the extent of similarities and differences between longand short-tenured directors regarding their involvement in strategic issues. The present study was
designed to investigate this issue. Specifically, its purpose is to determine whether a
______________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 3
BOARD PARTICIPATION IN STRATEGIC DECISIONS
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Author(s)

Year

Findings

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

A. Studies Showing Minimal Board Participation
Whisler

1984

“Rules of the game” is to minimize participation in setting strategy

Mace

1986

Boards do not participate in strategic decisions unless faced with a
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crisis
Patton and Baker 1987

Members are reluctant to “rock the boat” and get involved

Lorsch

1989

Directors want to increase their involvement but are reluctant to do so.

Judge and
Zeithaml

1992

The great majority of boards are not actively working with
management to develop strategic action.

Daily and Dalton 1995

Norms of reciprocity: Board appointments confer prestige and status,
financial rewards and various perquisites. Members feel socially
obligated to support the CEO and minimize any meaningful
participation

Wall Street
Journal

Social ties between top managers and outside directors tend to be
be “chummy” or even “collusive” thus diminishing board effectiveness

1996

B. Studies Showing Active Board Participation
Worthy and
Neuschel

1984

A major increase has taken place in the duties, power, and
responsibilities of corporate boards

Westphal

1999

Social ties between the CEO and the board encourage collaboration
between top managers and outside directors in strategic decision
making

Heidrick and
Struggles

1990

Board members are increasingly involved in determining and
monitoring the strategic directions of the organization.

Dobrzynski

1989

“Quietly, many boards are asserting themselves - redirecting strategy
here, vetoing an investment there” (p. 66).

relationship exists between hospital directors’ length of tenure and their degree of involvement in
the strategic management process.
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______________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 4
______________________________________________________________________________
STUDIES OF HOSPITAL GOVERNING BOARDS
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Author(s)

Year

Focus

Findings

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Witt

1993

Board training Most hospitals did not have any policies for training
policies
and developing board members. Most directors did
not have any board experience in large organizations

Molinari et al.

1992

Board training Boards whose members attended training programs
programs
were better informed about management issues and
changes in the external environment, and were
associated with improved financial performance

Molinari et al.

1997

Relationship
with CEO

CEO participation on boards was associated with
enhanced hospital financial performance

Gardner

1992

Board
composition

The importance of including nurses in hospital boards
because they have a health care background

Goes and Zhan 1995

Board
composition

Physician membership on boards was associated with
higher operating margins and occupancy

Molinari et al.
Delbeq and
Gill

Board
composition

A high proportion of directors with business-related
occupations provided boards with up-to-date operational information and financial and strategic expertise

Board
composition

Boards with a higher proportion of insiders and
business directors made more changes in their mix of
services in response to legislative reform

Social responsiveness
orientation

Compared to those with a healthcare background,
directors who did not have such a background were
more concerned with economic and legal issues

1993
1988

Gautam and
Goodstein

1996

Ibrahim et al.

2000
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METHODS
A total of 291 directors from twenty-one hospitals in six southeastern and three
northeastern states were asked to participate in the study. The survey questionnaires were
completed immediately following a regularly scheduled board meeting. Two hundred-and-fiftyone responses were received (86.3% response rate). Interestingly, the response rate from each
hospital was in the 81-to-89 percent range. On the average, the hospitals had 409 set-up-andstaffed beds.
In addition to several demographic items, each participant's level of involvement was
based on an adaptation of studies involving hospital boards and other previous research (Boulton,
1978; Patton & Baker, 1987; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal, 1999; Blake, 1999; Zahra,
1990; Dulewitz et al., 1995). A seventeen-item scale was constructed to measure the extent of a
board member's participation in corporate strategic management. They were framed to address
the following areas: Broad cross-functional strategic matters, overall hospital performance,
performance of top executives, and internal and external issues. Responses were made on a fourpoint scale on which the higher the number the greater the perceived involvement.
FINDINGS
The respondents were predominantly male (77%) and white (86%) with an average age
of 54 years. The mean number of years they had served on their respective boards was 9.6
(median = 9). Ninety-nine percent had an undergraduate college degree, 27 percent were medical
doctors, and 34 percent earned another professional degree or a graduate degree. Approximately
three-quarters (77%) of these boards meet monthly, 16 percent meet bimonthly, and 7 percent
hold quarterly meetings.
A median split was conducted to separate respondents into long- (more than nine years)
and short-tenure (less than nine years) groups. Since ten respondents had a tenure of nine years,
each group contained 120 persons. The results of chi-square tests and a t-test showed no
significant differences between the two groups with respect to gender (χ 2 = 1.91, p = .17), level
of education (χ 2 = 0.48, p = .79), and the size of the hospital on whose boards they served (t =
1.77, p = .09). Another t-test showed that the long-tenure directors were slightly older than the
short-tenure directors (56.2 versus 51.6 years old). Although this difference is statistically
significant (t = 6.44, p < .00), it was not considered to be of any practical significance.
Descriptive statistics for all seventeen measures of director involvement are displayed in
Table 5. The table also shows the rankings (based on the means of scores) of the responses
provided by each group. The analysis of these results was performed in three stages. First, the
Spearman rank-order correlation test was conducted to determine to what extent the rankings are
similar. The results (r s = 0.97, p = 0.0001) indicate that there are no significant differences
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between the two sets and that they are positively correlated. That is, there is a high degree of
consistency between the two groups’ rankings. Closer examination of Table 5 shows that the
means of the two groups’ scores on each of the items are different. For this reason, a second test
was conducted to explore these differences. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
procedure was considered to be the most appropriate analytic technique. It compensates for
variable intercorrelation and provides an omnibus test of any multivariate effect. The MANOVA
revealed significant differences between the long- and short-tenure directors (Wilks’ Λ = 0.568, p
= 0.03). That is, overall, the two groups exhibited different degrees of involvement.
Finally, to understand the underlying contributions of the variables to the significant multivariate
effect, each of the seventeen dependent variables was tested using a series of one- way analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) with the two groups treated as our two levels of the independent variable.
The results, depicted in Table 6, show that differences between the two samples were significant
on eleven of the seventeen variables. No significant differences were found in the following six
areas: reviewing the board’s overall role and responsibilities, defining/reviewing the hospital’s
mission/vision statement, conducting an analysis of the internal environment, developing
strategic alternatives, reviewing the hospital’s overall structure, and ensuring the hospital’s
development of its human resources. However, it is important to note that, in all six areas, the
long-term directors’ mean scores were greater than those of the short-term group.
PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS
The present study is an attempt to partially fill a void by examining similarities and
differences among hospital directors based on the length of their tenure. It led to several insights
about this relationship. When the means and rankings shown in Table 5 are analyzed, several
patterns emerge. More than two-thirds of the scores of long-tenure directors are higher than
those of their counterparts but there is a very high degree of agreement between the two groups
in terms of the “ranking” of the items. Specifically, the top eight items of the short-tenure
sample correspond to seven of the top eight items of the long-tenure directors. These are
generally most directly related to broad, cross-functional strategic issues such as
defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission-vision statement, reviewing the board’s overall role
and responsibilities, analyzing the external and internal environments, providing advice and
counsel in discussions outside of board/committee meetings, and developing strategic
alternatives. Also, they address the hospital’s relationship with its major stakeholders.
With respect to setting standards for and evaluating top management’s performance,
reviewing the hospital’s overall structure, and ensuring the development of the hospital’s human
resources, both groups’ rankings were identical. Also, these four items had the lowest scores.
Indeed, both samples’ scores were well below 2.0. This suggests that both groups were least
interested in or preferred to limit their participation in these four areas.

10

Spring 2012
Volume 11, Number 1
The results of the ANOVAs show that, compared to directors with short-term tenure,
longer-tenured members were more involved in developing strategic alternatives, providing
advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee meetings, and setting standards for
and evaluating the performance of the hospital and management. It is interesting to note that,
although longer tenured members were more active in setting standards and evaluating top
management’s performance, their involvement was quite limited (scores well below 2.0). This
suggests a reluctance to monitor and evaluate top management’s performance. A related issue is
evident upon a careful inspection of Table 5. Both groups of directors were much more involved
in setting standards for overall hospital performance than in setting standards for rewarding top
management’s performance (short-tenure directors: t = 22.35, p < .00; long-tenure directors: t =
18.49, p < .00).
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE 5
MEANS AND RANKINGS OF DIRECTORS’ SCORES
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Overall
Short-tenure
Long-tenure
(n = 240)
(n = 120)
(n = 120)
_____________
______________
______________
Variable
Mean Ranking
Mean Ranking
Mean Ranking
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewing the board’s overall role and responsibilities
3.56
1
3.52
1
3.60
1
Defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission/vision statement
3.50
2
3.47
2
3.52
2
Conducting an analysis of the external environment
3.27
3
3.30
3
3.24
3
Taking into account the legitimate interests of major stakeholders 3.22
4
3.31
4
3.13 a
4
Promoting the goodwill and support of major stakeholders
3.18
5
3.29
5
3.07
6
Developing strategic alternatives
3.07
6
3.00
6
3.13 a
4
Conducting an analysis of the internal environment
3.02
7
2.99
7
3.04
7
Evaluating operating variances
2.84
8
2.93
8
2.75
9
Providing advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/
committee meetings
2.78
9
2.60
11
2.96
8
Setting standards for overall hospital performance
2.65
10
2.57
10
2.72
10
Analyzing financial information for important issues and trends
2.48 a
11
2.59
9
2.34
12
Evaluating overall hospital performance against the strategic plan 2.48 a
11
2.30
13
2.64
11
Benchmarking the strategic plan with industry comparative data
2.28
13
2.43
12
2.12
13
Setting standards for rewarding top management’s performance
1.52
14
1.42
14
1.61
14
Formally evaluating the performance of top management
1.33
15
1.27
15
1.39
15
Reviewing the hospital’s overall structure
1.14
16
1.12
16
1.16
16
Ensuring the hospital’s development of human resources
1.06
17
1.04
17
1.07
17
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
The scale ranged from 1 = no involvement to 4 = much involvement.
b
Denotes a tie.
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TABLE 6
ANOVA RESULTS FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SHORT-TENURE AND LONG-TENURE DIRECTORS
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Short-tenure
Long-tenure
(n = 120)
(n = 120)
___________
___________
Variable
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
F
p
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewing the board’s overall role and responsibilities
3.52
0.45
3.60
0.61
1.34
0.25
Defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission/vision statement
3.47
0.62
3.52
0.69
0.35
0.56
Conducting an analysis of the external environment
3.30
0.84
3.24
0.87
0.62
0.43
Taking into account the legitimate interests of major stakeholders
3.31
0.61
3.13 a 0.57
5.58
0.02
Promoting the goodwill and support of major stakeholders
3.29
0.62
3.07
0.60
7.80
0.01
a
Developing strategic alternatives
3.00
0.34
3.13
0.37
8.03
0.01
Conducting an analysis of the internal environment
2.99
0.51
3.04
0.57
0.51
0.47
Evaluating operating variances
2.93
0.55
2.75
0.50
7.04
0.01
Providing advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee
meetings
2.60
0.51
2.96
0.88
15.03
< 0.00
Setting standards for overall hospital performance
2.57
0.51
2.72
0.58
4.53
0.03
Analyzing financial information for important issues and trends
2.59
0.54
2.34
0.47
14.63
< 0.00
Evaluating overall hospital performance against the strategic plan
2.30
0.44
2.64
0.49
31.99
< 0.00
Benchmarking the strategic plan with industry comparative data
2.43
1.09
2.12
0.98
5.37
0.02
Setting standards for rewarding top management’s performance
1.42
0.24
1.61
0.31
28.19
< 0.00
Formally evaluating the performance of top management
1.27
0.30
1.37
0.33
7.62
0.01
Reviewing the hospital’s overall structure
1.12
0.19
1.16
0.29
1.60
0.21
Ensuring the hospital’s development of human resources
1.04
0.36
1.07
0.31
0.48
0.49
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
The scale ranged from 1 = no involvement to 4 = much involvement.
b
Denotes a tie.
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The results also show that, compared to their long-tenured counterparts, short-tenure directors were
more concerned with the interests of major stakeholders and promoting their goodwill and support. Also, they
were more actively involved in financial matters (benchmarking, analyzing financial information, and
evaluating operating variances). Regarding the similarities between the two groups, no significant differences
were found for the three items that received the highest scores and the two items that received the lowest scores
from each group. This suggests that there is agreement that the top three items are the most “strategic” and
require board members’ involvement while the bottom two items are of the least concern to board members.
They are more related to the day-to-day management of the organization. Consequently, board involvement is
focused on other areas.
This study has important implications and raises an essential issue for the expanding literature on the
composition of hospital boards of directors. While prior research has focused primarily on the impact of the
membership make-up of boards on issues such as social responsibility and financial performance, there has been
a dearth of research on directors’ tenure. The relationships we found between tenure and level of participation
raise potentially important strategic dilemmas for hospitals: longer-tenured board members are not as concerned
with financial matters as well as stakeholders’ interests and support as their short-tenured counterparts. Yet
hospitals are under increased pressure to focus on financial performance and abide by numerous legal and
regulatory requirements. Hospital administrators, researchers, regulators, public policy advocates, and other
stakeholders advocating changes in board membership may need to consider the implications of these findings.
Also, although longer-tenured members were more active in setting standards for rewarding top management
and assessing their performance, it is important to note the limited involvement of both groups. Therefore, one
of this study's findings appears to be consistent with previous research showing CEO domination of the board
and the directors’ need to ingratiate themselves or curry favor with the CEO (Westphal, 1999). Indeed, the
independence of directors and the critical need to adequately monitor the performance of the CEO and other
managers has been found to be an essential requirement for board effectiveness (Dalton et al., 1999). Future
research efforts need to determine the possible reasons for the reluctance of short-tenured members to express
their views.
Regarding the similarities between the two groups, it is interesting that the three items where the two
groups’ scores were not significantly different also received the lowest scores from both groups. With respect to
the two other issues – setting standards for evaluating top management’s performance and formally evaluating
the performance of top management – the results show a reluctance by both groups to examine these two areas.
Certainly, caveats must be offered regarding conclusions generated by this research. Clearly, the
differences between the two groups in terms of their degree of involvement reinforce the importance of
examining the composition of hospital boards. However, larger samples are needed to assess the robustness of
these results. Additional research is necessary to determine whether a director's level of participation does
translate into organizational action. Also, since most board decisions are made by committees, in the future
researchers may want to investigate the possible impact of group dynamics on member involvement. Another
limitation concerns the use of the median-split to create the four subgroups. The conversion of a continuous
variable into a categorical variable tends to lead to information loss and decreases the sensitivity of the
measurement instrument. Finally, board members' degree of involvement was reported by the directors
themselves. Although the possibility of bias cannot be completely ruled out, a number of authors have pointed
out that self-report measures are indispensable in organizational research (Gupta & Beehr, 1982; Podsakoff &
Organ, 1986). This is consistent with Steiner and Miner’s (1986) assertion that direct observation of top
executives at work is not a practical approach; “only self-reports ... can provide an indication of the time ...
spent in decision making and planning ...” (p. 195). Indeed, in certain research contexts, self-reports may
provide more accurate estimates of population parameters than behavioral measures (Howard et al., 1980).
In conclusion, the findings of this study highlight an area of growing concern to society and all types of
organizations. The directors' role in the strategic process is likely to expand due to increased risks of legal
14

liability and the public’s (and patients’) unrelenting insistence for safe and high quality products and services.
In health care, the issue of board members' involvement is likely to gain increased attention because of societal
demands on hospitals and many questions regarding the strategic dimensions of decision making. The results
are a reminder that major differences exist between directors based on their tenure. This offers proponents of
changes in board composition support for their normative suggestions.
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